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Connecting the dotsA simple regulatory fix to the coming power crisisPosted by Sean Casten (Guest Contributor) at 3:38 PM on 18 Jul 2008Our electric regulatory model is broken. It preferentially deploys expensive power sources before cheap ones. It compares the variable costs of dirty fuels to the all-in costs of clean fuels and deludes itself into thinking that the dirty, expensive power is economically advantaged. It places the interests of utility shareholders above the interests of other potential investors in our power grid, massively skewing capital allocation, even while it insulates utility investors from the disciplines imposed by a competitive market. These problems arise fundamentally from the over-regulation of our electric sector, which has created stable utilities, but virtually no opportunities for the kind of economic "upside" necessary to attract entrepreneurs into the sector. This ought to be good news; after all, we Americans are really good at taking risks, deploying our prodigious entrepreneurial talents and making big financial bets. The problems we face all play to our strengths. Unfortunately, any positive change to our system is by definition deregulatory -- a word that has been politically poisoned by the botched restructuring (don't call it dereg!) in California and Enron's machinations. As factually irrelevant as those bogeymen may be to any discussion of deregulation, they present formidable political obstacles to reform -- and only the most quixotic windmill-tilter chases reforms that are politically untenable to both sides of the aisle. Houston, we have a solution. The outline below describes a regulatory structure that we have been developing, built upon existing "standard offer" programs in California and Ontario, and extending based on recent and on-going conversations with a broad swathe of utility executives and regulators. We expect to shortly announce the roll-out of this plan with a major U.S. utility, and continue to refine and enhance for maximum viability. We'd also like to hear from you. Tell us what flaws you see in this, but more importantly, suggest tweaks to improve, subject to a few ground rules:
If you disagree with those points, you won't find us very receptive. But within those points, we welcome your thoughts on how to strengthen the policy proposal outlined below. We hold these truths ... Harry Truman said famously that you can get a lot done if you don't care who gets the credit. Getting to this point first means setting up a goal in which lots of folks can claim victory (and therefore have an incentive to take credit). When it comes to electric system reform, this means that politically-viable reforms need not only to create economic and environmental value to society, but also need to recognize the economic interests of regulated utilities and the political interests of regulators. Clearly, our existing regulatory model has failed to deploy the cheapest or cleanest generation sources. But just because that's true doesn't mean there's much to be gained by rubbing the noses of the regulated or the regulator in that fact. However, if we don't reform, we are going to deploy technologies that will massively increase both electricity costs and associated CO2 emissions. As such, I'd suggest the following framework foes any near-term regulatory reform of the electric sector:
With that in mind, we have developed the Clean Energy Standard Offer Program. Its basic principles are as follows:
Note what the CESOP does. All traditional renewables are eligible, as are thermally-matched CHP, waste heat recovery, and any other technology we haven't yet thought of. The goal of lower fossil-intensivity is rewarded without getting caught up in a specific path. Further, it subverts the argument that non-utility power sources aren't economically viable, since any participating power plant is, by definition, at least 20 percent cheaper on a delivered basis than the central alternative. But it still retains a role for the regulator, who is still obliged to use their efforts to deploy the cheapest possible technology they can identify within their regulatory paradigm. The better they do at their job, the better off society is as we deploy ever-cheaper power. And it still retains a role for the utility to manage and operate the grid, with sufficient compensation for their efforts. Perhaps most importantly though, it dramatically levels the playing field for the local power plant. A big, expensive, central coal plant has the perverse luxury of very cheap money, granted at the moment the utility regulator says "yup, you can build that", since it then gets guaranteed rates set by the government. By contrast, a cost-effective local power plant selling power to a local industrial or residential user must pay very high borrowing costs due to the comparatively higher credit risk of their host. (Joe's Paper Company being much more likely to miss a couple payments than New York State.) By granting clean energy plants with the same underlying credit risk as the utility -- but still holding them accountable for performance, since they won't get paid unless they produce those MWh -- the CESOP makes it dramatically easier to finance clean power while still keeping competitive pressure upon the industry. So now it's your turn. Where do you see holes? Where can we improve? (And if you have no criticisms, use the space below for hagiography as necessary.)
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